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ALL PUFF AND NO STUFF: AVOIDING THE
IDEA/EXPRESSION DICHOTOMY
I. INTRODUCTION
Television commercials are often entertaining. Copyright law rec-
ognizes advertising as an art form and extends protection to the authors.
However, copyright law protects only the expression of an idea, not the
idea itself. The issue is where to draw the line between an idea and the
expression of that idea. Courts have formulated several tests to deter-
mine where the idea ends and expression begins. While the tests are
helpful, none of them are completely accurate. In fact, some have proved
troublesome and confusing.
In C. Blore & D. Richman, Inc. v. 20/20 Advertising' ("Blore"), the
United States District Court for Minnesota held that the editing, nontex-
tual and stylistic aspects of the plaintiffs' commercials were expressive
elements entitled to copyright protection.2 In reaching its decision, the
court applied the Ninth Circuit's extrinsic/intrinsic test.' The court in
Blore avoided separating ideas from expression, illustrating the problem
with the Ninth Circuit test.
II. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Blore involved a dispute over a series of television commercials pro-
duced by the defendants, 20/20 Advertising ("20/20") and Duling Opti-
cal Corporation ("Duling").4 The plaintiffs, Chuck Blore & Don
Richman, Inc. ("Blore"), claimed that Duling had substantially copied
Blore's "Deborah Daily News" commercial.5 Duling and 20/20 filed a
motion for summary judgment, claiming that the allegedly copied por-
tions of the Blore commercials were merely ideas or concepts, not enti-
tled to copyright protection.6
Blore's copyrighted commercials feature the actress Deborah
Shelton, best known for her role as Mandy Winger in the television series
"Dallas." Blore produced the first commercial featuring Shelton in 1980.
1. 674 F. Supp. 671 (D. Minn. 1987).
2. Id. at 677.
3. Id. at 679.
4. Id. at 673.
5. Duling representatives admit to making unauthorized copies of the "Deborah Daily
News" tape. l at 674.
6. Id. at 675.
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In 1986, Blore produced six other Shelton commercials, including
"Deborah Daily News."
The commercials were approximately twenty-five to thirty seconds
long, during which Shelton extolled the virtues of either a South Carolina
radio station or "The Daily News," which circulates in the San Fernando
Valley in California. Television stations ran these commercials in and
around South Carolina and the San Fernando Valley, respectively.'
Each commercial opened with a closeup of Shelton wearing an un-
buttoned white shirt with blue stripes. The word "Deborah" appeared in
the lower left of the screen. A series of rapid edits followed, including
twenty closeups of Shelton's face against a green background. With each
line of text spoken by Shelton, the camera cut to a new closeup featuring
Shelton in a different pose with a different hairstyle and expression. 9
In 1986, the defendant, Duling, decided to change its advertising
strategy. Duling's previous commercials used noncelebrities speaking di-
rectly to the audience without using music or props. In the new com-
mercials, Duling decided to use a celebrity spokesperson with "nice
eyes." ° It narrowed the list of celebrities down to Shelton and one other
actress. Before any of its employees viewed Blore's "Deborah Daily
News" commercial, Duling selected Shelton for its commercials. I
The Duling commercial was thirty seconds long and presented four-
teen different poses of Shelton. The first pose was a closeup with the
words "Deborah Shelton" appearing at the lower right of the screen.
The commercial also contained medium range shots in which Shelton's
upper body was visible. In each pose Shelton wore a different hairstyle, a
blue striped blouse that was alternatively buttoned and unbuttoned, and
either a different pair of glasses or no glasses at all. With each new pose,
Shelton read a new line of text.' 2
7. Blore, 674 F. Supp. at 673.
8. Id. at 674, 681.
9. The text of the Blore commercials was as follows:
What do the Daily News and a hot bubble bath have in common? Me. I just love
them both. Everybody knows about the Daily News' commitment to the Valley
[a]nd its commitment to excellence. There is another paper that says it covers the
Valley [b]ut everybody knows [t]hey're over the hill. Can you imagine living in the
Valley and not reading the Daily News? That's like wearing all new underwear and
not getting hit by a bus. What a waste. Daily News. Daily [a]nd Sunday. You
[o]ught to look into that.
Id. at 674.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 673-74.
12. The text of the Duling commercials was as follows:
There are some things in life that should take more than an hour. But making your
glasses isn't one of them. Duling Optical Super Store [h]as thousands of designer
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The text and the subject matter of the Duling commercials were
entirely different from the Blore commercials.' 3 However, Blore con-
tended that "the producers of the Duling commercials [had] substantially
copied the expressive elements of the Blore commercials."' 4 In particu-
lar, Blore alleged that the editing, changing of hairstyle, the framing, the
use of a striped blouse, the positioning of the collar on the blouse, the
jewelry, the tone of voice, the raising of eyebrows, and the voice level
were substantially similar to that of its commercials.' 5
Blore brought suit in the United States District Court for Minnesota
alleging copyright infringement. Duling and 20/20 moved for summary
judgment contending that "neither the use of Shelton as the sole spokes-
woman for a particular product, nor the use of rapid-edit close-ups
[were] entitled to protection under ... copyright ... law[ ]."16 Further,
they argued that Blore was attempting to monopolize the use of the rapid
edit montage style 7 involving closeups of Deborah Shelton, even though
Blore did not have an exclusive licensing agreement with her. Therefore,
Duling argued that, as a matter of law, Blore could not prove copying
because any nontextual similarities between the commercials involved
nonprotectable material.' 8 In denying the motion for summary judg-
ment,' 9 the court found that the nontextual, stylistic aspects of Blore's
television commercial were proper subjects of copyright protection.20
III. THE COURT'S HOLDING AND REASONING
The court found that the commercials at issue in Blore were audiovi-
sual works, making them eligible for protection under the copyright stat-
ute. 2' The court concluded that the individual artistic choices, such as
frames [a]nd contact lenses to choose from. I can have my eyes examined [a]nd have
my new glasses and [c]ontact lenses in about an hour. And they're guaranteed to be
[p]rescription perfect. The Duling Optical Super Store [t]he one-stop shopping [t]hat
allows me more time for [o]ther things.
Blore, 674 F. Supp. at 674-75.
13. Id. at 675.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Rapid-edit montage style edits frames of the film so it appears that the commercial
flashes to a new sequence. The effect is similar to a slide show.
18. Blore, 674 F. Supp. at 675-76.
19. Id. at 680.
20. Id. at 678.
21. The court cited 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982):
'Audiovisual works' are works that consist of a series of related images which are
intrinsically intended to be shown by the use of machines or devices such as projec-
tors, viewers, or electronic equipment, together with the accompanying sounds, if
1989]
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montage style, camera angle, framing, hairstyle, jewelry, decor, makeup,
and background are expressive aspects that, together with the sounds or
text, make up the concept of the Blore commercials.22 As part of the
total communicative impact of the medium, these expressive elements
could not be "divorced from the text and deemed irrelevant.
23
The Blore court relied on cases involving photographs24 and motion
pictures25 to support their finding that the copyright laws protected spe-
cific artistic choices. 26 The court, as in the photograph and motion pic-
ture cases, found these artistic choices, including the rapid edit style and
the use of closeups, inherent in the visual style and tone of the Blore
commercials, regardless of the characterization of the idea.27 The court
stated: "It is that expression, reflecting the unique perspective of individ-
ual creators which is entitled to protection.
28
Duling and 20/20 relying on Miller Brewing Co. v. Carling O'Keefe
Breweries of Canada, Ltd.,9 argued that the Blore commercials merely
represented the idea or concept of rapid edit closeup shots of a model
and, therefore, were not entitled to copyright protection.3° The Miller
court held that commercials featuring arm wrestling, arguments in a tav-
ern, poetry recitation, and siblings speaking in unison were only ideas or
themes and did not constitute expressions subject to copyright
protection.3
The Blore court distinguished Miller. Although both cases involved
television commercials, the copyright issue in Miller centered on literary
rather than audiovisual aspects of the commercial.32 The court stated
that literary elements are generally considered matters of public domain
not entitled to copyright protection. Additionally, the literary elements
any, regardless of the nature of the material objects, such as films or tapes, in which
the works are embodied.
Blore, 674 F. Supp. at 677.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Kisch v. Ammirati & Purs, Inc., 657 F. Supp. 380 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
25. Time Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assoc., 293 F. Supp. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (home movie
films of the John F. Kennedy assassination were found copyrightable because they embodied
many elements of creativity including kind of camera (movie not snapshot), kind of film
(color), kind of lens (telephoto), area covered, timing and filming location).
26. Blore, 674 F. Supp. at 678.
27. Id.
28. Id. (citing Jewelers' Circular Publishing Co. v. Keystone Publishing Co., 274 F. 932
(S.D.N.Y. 1921) (every photograph no matter how simple is influenced by the individual per-
sonality of the photographer)).
29. 452 F. Supp. 429 (W.D.N.Y. 1978).
30. Blore, 674 F. Supp. at 676.
31. Miller, 452 F. Supp. at 440. See infra text accompanying notes 144-49.
32. Blore, 674 F. Supp. at 678.
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may include the recurrence of certain archetypical similarities in the plot,
setting, and character development which were not at issue in the Blore
commercials.33 The Blore court found, in contrast to Miller, that the
infringement issue involved "style not substance, images and tone not
plots or characters."3 4 These stylistic devices, the court said, go to the
heart of copyright protection.35
Since the court found the nontextual, editing, and stylistic aspects of
the Blore commercials proper subjects of copyright protection, it consid-
ered the issue of substantial similarity between the commercials. 36 The
court used the Ninth Circuit test, a two step extrinsic/intrinsic analy-
sis.37 In the extrinsic step, the court compared the works for similarity of
ideas a.3  It found extrinsic similarities in Blore's and Duling's use of tele-
vision to present their thirty second commercials and the use of Deborah
Shelton to promote their products. Then, the court went on to apply the
intrinsic step, comparing similarity in expression. The Blore court found
the intrinsic test very difficult to apply to commercials because of their
brevity.39 However, the court found substantial similarity in the "overall
concept and feel" of the commercials and accordingly denied Duling's
and 20/20's motion for summary judgment."
IV. THE ORIGIN AND PURPOSE OF COPYRIGHT PROTECTION
The United States Constitution provides that Congress has the
power "to promote the progress of science and the useful arts, by secur-
ing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive rights to their
respective writings and discoveries."4 With this power, Congress en-
acted the Copyright Act of 1976.42 This statute grants the author a pri-
33. Id. (citing Walker v. Time Life Films, Inc., 784 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1986) cert. denied, 476
U.S. 1159 (1986) (scenes involving foot chases, morale problems of police officers in the Bronx,
and depiction of Irish police officers as drinkers were standard lore in police fiction and not
entitled to copyright protection); Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir.
1930) cert. denied, 282 U.S. 902 (1931) (structural and thematic elements of plaintiff's play
"Abie's Irish Rose" were not entitled to copyright protection)).
34. Blore, 674 F. Supp. at 678.
35. Id. (citing Steinberg v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 663 F. Supp. 706 (S.D.N.Y.
1987)).
36. Blore, 674 F. Supp. at 679.
37. Id. See infra text accompanying note 88 for a discussion of the Ninth Circuit test.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 679-80 (citing Miller, 452 F. Supp. at 441 (brevity of commercials precluded
resort to detailed comparisons)).
40. Blore, 674 F. Supp. at 680.
41. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
42. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1982).
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vate monopoly for a limited time43 and the exclusive right to print,
reprint, publish, copy, vend, and perform the copyrighted work for
profit.' The purpose of this protection is to stimulate development in
the arts and sciences, assuring that the intellectual and aesthetic product
of authors will be made available for the benefit of the public.45
A. History of Copyright Protection for Advertising
The word "advertising" does not appear in the list of subject matter
covered by the Copyright Act.46 However, the list is intended to be "il-
lustrative and not limitative,"47 allowing the courts the flexibility to de-
termine the scope of particular categories.48 Through the courts'
interpretation, advertising has been brought under the protection of the
copyright laws.
In 1891, the United States Supreme Court, in Higgins v. Keuffel,4 9
first considered whether advertising could be copyrighted. The Court
found such writings have "no possible influence upon science or the use-
ful arts."5 ° Because the Constitution provided only for the protection of
works that would promote science and the useful arts, the Court held
that Congress could not protect commercial writings.51
In 1903, the Supreme Court, in Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing
Co., 52 rejected Higgins' broad holding that commercial matter is not en-
titled to copyright protection. The Court held that a picture used in an
advertisement is copyrightable.53 Justice Holmes, writing for the major-
ity, stated that only an absence of sufficient originality would place com-
mercial matter outside the scope of copyright protection.54 The dissent
adopted a broader reading of Higgins, stating that the pictorial illustra-
tion must have some connection to the fine arts to give it intrinsic value
and bring it within the provision of the Constitution. 5
Bleistein signifies a change favoring copyright protection of advertis-
ing. However, the Court found the picture contained in the advertise-
43. 1 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.03[A], at 1-32 (1988).
44. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982).
45. 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 43, § 1.03[A], at 1-31 to -32.
46. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982).
47. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1976).
48. Id.
49. 140 U.S. 428 (1891).
50. Id. at 431.
51. Id.
52. 188 U.S. 239 (1903).
53. Id. at 251.
54. Id. at 251-52.
55. Id. at 252-53 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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ment worthy of protection because it had sufficient artistic merit as a
picture.5 6 Thus, Bleistein can have two meanings." First, copyright law
may protect an advertisement only to the extent that the advertisement's
individual elements-illustrations, copy, graphics, and layout-are pro-
tected. Second, and more broadly, the copyright laws may protect adver-
tising, unless it is a label or a descriptive phrase so lacking in originality
that it cannot be considered a writing.58 Federal courts have adopted the
broad reading of Bleistein, consistently finding advertising containing
only a modicum of originality protectable under copyright legislation.59
B. The Idea/Expression Dichotomy
The principle that copyright does not protect against the borrowing
of ideas contained in the copyrighted work is codified in the current
Copyright Act.' A central goal of copyright law is balancing the com-
peting interests in rewarding individuals for their "unique creative ef-
forts" while "making authors' 'ideas freely accessible to the public so
that they may be used for the intellectual advancement of mankind.' "61
The idea/expression dichotomy attempts to resolve these competing con-
siderations.62 Copyright rewards authors for their "unique creative ef-
forts" by granting them limited monopolies in the profits generated by
their work.63 The ideas are thrust into the public domain so that they
may be used for the intellectual advancement of mankind, thereby pro-
moting science and the useful arts."
The courts have continually struggled with the problem of separat-
ing idea from expression. Historically, copyright laws restricted infringe-
56. Id at 251.
57. Linder, Why Copyright Law Should Not Protect Advertising, 62 OR. L. REV. 231, 234
(1983).
58. Id. See also 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982). Section 102(a) provides: "Copyright protection
subsists, in accordance with this title, in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible
medium of expression, now known or later developed, from which they can be perceived,
reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or
device ......
59. See Linder, supra note 57; Borden, Copyright of Advertising, 35 Ky. L.J. 205 (1947);
COMMENT, Copyrights - The Protection of Advertising, 5 VILL. L. REV. 615 (1960).
60. 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 43, § 13.03[AI[i], at 13-20.2 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 102(b)
(1982)). See also Reyher v. Childrens Television Workshop, 387 F. Supp. 869 (S.D.N.Y.
1975), aff'd, 533 F.2d 87 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 980 (1976) (similarity of idea
but not of expression between illustrations).
61. Hemnes, The Adaptation of Copyright Law to Video Games, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 171,
207 (1982) (quoting 3 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03[A], at 13-19 (1988)).
62. Hemnes, supra note 61, at 207.
63. Id.
64. Id.
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ment to verbatim copying of the entire original work.6 5 The present
Copyright Act protects "all aspects of an 'original work of authorship'
except 'any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, con-
cept, principle, or discovery' that is 'described, explained, illustrated or
embodied' in the work."
6 6
V. ESTABLISHING INFRINGEMENT
To establish copyright infringement,67 the plaintiff must prove that
he owns a valid copyright and that the defendant copied his work.68 The
plaintiff can prove copying by showing defendant's access 69 to the copy-
righted material, and substantial similarity between the protectable ele-
ments of the two works.
70
Determining substantial similarity is an issue of fact.71 To aid the
fact finder in this determination, courts apply either the abstractions test
or the ordinary observer test. 72 Additionally, some courts have devel-
oped important modifications of the ordinary observer test.
73
A. The Abstractions Test
In one of his last copyright cases, Judge Learned Hand said, "Obvi-
ously, no principle can be stated as to when an imitator has gone beyond
the 'idea' and has borrowed its 'expression.' Decisions must therefore
inevitably be ad hoc. "74 Judge Hand did, however, suggest a helpful ap-
proach to the problem in his famous "abstractions test."75 Under this
65. Id. at 207-08.
66. Id. at 208-09 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1976 & Supp. V 1981)).
67. It is undisputed that Blore had a valid copyright in his commercials, and that Duling
had access to the copyrighted commercials. Blore, 674 F. Supp. at 675.
68. 3 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.01, at 13-3 to -4 (1988).
69. Access may be shown by circumstantial evidence such as "striking similarity" between
the works. 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 68, § 13.02[B], at 13-14 to -16. Access will not be
discussed because Duling and 20/20 do not dispute that they had access to the Blore commer-
cials. Blore, 674 F. Supp. at 675.
70. Blare, 674 F. Supp. at 675.
71. 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 68, § 13.03[E], at 13-47 (citing Malkin v. Dubinsky, 146 F.
Supp. 111 (S.D.N.Y. 1956)).
72. Id. § 13.03[A], at 13-20 to -20.5, § 13.03[E], at 13-47 to -48.
73. See Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prod., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157
(9th Cir. 1977); see also Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946).
74. 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 68, § 13.03[A], at 13-22.2 (quoting Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc.
v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960)).
75. Judge Hand articulated what is known as the "abstractions test":
Upon any work.., a great number of patterns of increasing generality will fit equally
well, as more and more of the incident is left out .... [Tihere is a point in this series
of abstractions where they are no longer protected, since otherwise the playwright
could prevent the use of his "ideas," to which, apart from their expression, his prop-
[Vol. 9
COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT
test, layers of detail are removed from the works until they are similar.
A trier of fact then decides whether the similarity is of idea or expression,
based on the work's level of abstraction. This test has proven useful in
analyzing dramatic works, literary works, and motion pictures, where
recurring patterns can readily be abstracted into very general themes.
While the abstractions test is helpful, it does not indicate at which level
of abstraction a work crosses the line from idea to expression. However,
when correctly applied, the test offers a general guide which avoids the
conclusion that "nothing more can be said than that each case turns on
its own facts."76
B. The Ordinary Observer Test and its Modifications
The ordinary observer test involves a comparison of the original and
the infringing work. The objective of the test is "to ascertain the effect of
the alleged infringing [work] upon the public, that is, upon the average
reasonable man.. .. "" If an ordinary person has a spontaneous and
immediate reaction to the similarities in the works, a "literary piracy" or
infringement exists.7" Although critics claim that the courts misapply
the test,79 the test has not been completely rejected.80 In the wake of
such criticism, the Second and Ninth Circuits have modified the ordinary
observer test. The modifications retain the original ordinary observer
test while adding an additional step. Both the Second and Ninth Circuits
refer to the additional step as the "extrinsic test," however, each applies
the test differently.
1. The Second Circuit Test
The first modification occurred in Arnstein v. Porter."' The Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit in Arnstein divided the issue of substan-
tial similarity into two elements. The first element, the extrinsic test,
compares the works using expert analysis 2 and dissection83 to establish
erty is never extended. Nobody has ever been able to fix that boundary, and nobody
ever can ....
3 M. NIMMER, supra note 68, § 13.03[A], at 13-20.4 (quoting Nichols v. Universal Pictures
Co., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930)).
76. 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 68, § 13.03[A], at 13-25 to -26.
77. Id. § 13.03[E], at 13-48 (quoting Harold Lloyd Corp. v. Witwer, 65 F.2d 1, 18 (9th
Cir. 1933)).
78. Id. (quoting Harold Lloyd Corp. v. Witwer, 65 F.2d 1, 18 (9th Cir. 1933)).
79. Id § 13.03[E], at 13-53.
80. Id. § 13.03[E], at 13-54.
81. 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946).
82. Expert analysis uses experts in the particular artistic medium to testify as to particular
customs and methods employed by the artists in the medium. The testimony is used to aid the
1989]
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copying. The second element, the intrinsic test, is conducted without
expert analysis and dissection. The intrinsic test is essentially an applica-
tion of the ordinary observer test to the protectable expression of the
works.8 4
Professor Nimmer offered a logical interpretation of this ambiguous
test. Nimmer suggested the extrinsic test requires a determination of
substantial similarity of expression, and not merely ideas; the court
should make this determination regardless of the protectability of such
expression.85 Essentially, the extrinsic test is an application of the ab-
stractions test. The intrinsic test applies the ordinary observer test to the
protectable expression. 6 Nimmer's interpretation of the Second Circuit
test allows expert analysis and dissection on the important issue of sepa-
rating idea from expression, rather than leaving this determination to the
ordinary observer. As Professor Nimmer states: "[t]he Copyright Act is
intended to protect writers from the theft of the fruits of their labor, not
to protect against the general public's 'spontaneous and immediate' im-
pression that the fruits have been stolen."8"
2. The Ninth Circuit Test
In Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prod., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp. ,88
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit built upon the Arnstein test,
again modifying the ordinary observer test. The elements of the test are
similarly referred to as the extrinsic and intrinsic tests, however, the
Ninth Circuit defines them differently than the Second Circuit.
Under the Ninth Circuit formulation, the extrinsic test allows expert
analysis and dissection to determine whether there is substantial similar-
ity of general ideas.8 9 Assuming that similarity of ideas is found in the
extrinsic test, the second element, the intrinsic test, addresses the issue of
substantial similarity in the expression of the ideas. The intrinsic test
depends on the response of the ordinary reasonable person, and dissec-
tion and expert analysis are not permitted.9"
fact finder in separating the ideas from the expression. See Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464,
473 (2d Cir. 1946).
83. Dissection involves analysis and comparison of the works by breaking them down and
comparing the elements. Id.
84. 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 68, § 13.03[E], at 13-54 to -56.
85. Id. § 13.03[E], at 13-59 to -60.
86. Id. § 13.03[E], at 13-60.
87. Id. § 13.03[E], at 13-49 (emphasis in original).
88. 562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977).
89. 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 68, § 13.03[E], at 13-56 to -57.
90. Id. § 13.03[E], at 13-57.
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Nimmer criticized the Ninth Circuit test, stating it "unnecessarily
limits the scope of the court's determination under the preliminary, ex-
trinsic, test."'" The only issue under the extrinsic test is idea similarity.
Since copyright does not protect ideas, either the plaintiff or the defend-
ant may stipulate to the copying of ideas whenever advantageous to
avoid expert analysis and dissection. Even if a party does not stipulate to
the copying of ideas, the value of expert analysis and dissection in the
extrinsic test is virtually nonexistent because the test does not separate
ideas from expression. In the intrinsic test, ideas are separated from ex-
pression by the less discriminating trier of fact applying the ordinary ob-
server standard. In effect, this turns the trier of fact into an art critic.92
Because the Ninth Circuit test virtually disposes of the extrinsic test,
courts rarely can rule for the defendant prior to trial, as in Blore, or
reverse on appeal a jury determination for the plaintiff.93
VI. BLORE: A RECENT DECISION INVOLVING THE SCOPE
OF THE EXTRINSIC TEST
The Blore court correctly pointed out that commercials are audiovi-
sual works protected under the broad definition in section 101 of the
1976 Copyright Act.94 Duling and 20/20, the defendants, did not dis-
pute either the existence of a valid copyright or the issue of access.95 The
issue, therefore, was whether the nontextual aspects of the Blore com-
mercials contained protectable, "expressive" elements.9 6
A. Comparison With Audiovisual Cases
The Blore court cited two cases which illustrate the problem of sepa-
rating idea from expression: Atari, Inc. v. North American Philips Con-
sumer Elec. Corp. 97 and Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prod., Inc. v.
McDonald's Corp.98
In Atari,99 the owners of the copyright to the videogame "Pac-Man"
91. Id. § 13.03[E], at 13-59.
92. "It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to constitute
themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrow and most
obvious limits." Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903).
93. 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 68, § 13.03[E], at 13-57 to -58 (citations omitted).
94. Blore, 674 F. Supp. at 677 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 101). For text of § 101 see supra note
21.
95. Blore, 674 F. Supp. at 675.
96. Id. at 675.
97. 672 F.2d 607 (7th Cir. 1982).
98. 562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977).
99. The Seventh Circuit's Atari opinion has been noted as "the preeminent case to date on
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sued the makers of a similar videogame "K.C. Munchkin" for copyright
infringement." °° The Atari court endorsed the ordinary observer test,
stating: "[T]he test is whether the accused work is so similar to the
plaintiff's work that an ordinary reasonable person would conclude that
the defendant unlawfully appropriated the plaintiff's protectible expres-
sion by taking material of substance and value."'01 The court focused its
analysis on the "total concept and feel" of the copyrighted work, avoid-
ing dissection and expert analysis. 102 However, since copyright protects
only the authors' expression and not the idea itself, the court distilled the
protectable forms of expression from the unprotected forms by using the
abstractions test and the concept of "scenes a faire"'0 3 before applying
the ordinary observer test. Thus, the Atari court seems to apply the Sec-
ond Circuit test, suggesting that the Seventh Circuit also believes it is
appropriate to separate the idea from its expression before applying the
ordinary observer test.
Applying the abstractions test to the Pac-Man game, the court
found that the game could be described accurately in abstract terms, just
as one would describe the rules to a game." 4 The court concluded that
the "maze-chase" game idea was not copyrightable.'0 5 Rather, the char-
acters, described as "wholly fanciful creations, without reference to the
real world,"'" represented the authors' artistic expression. The court
separated the unprotected ideas from their expression before finding in-
fringement based on the substantial appropriation of the characters.
0 7
the issue of copyright protection for video games. The court's exposition of the standard prin-
ciples of copyright law is thorough and accurate." Hemnes, supra note 61, at 196.
100. Atari, 672 F.2d at 610.
101. Hemnes, supra note 61, at 196 (quoting Atari, 672 F.2d at 614) (emphasis added).
102. Hemnes, supra note 61, at 196 (citing Atari, 672 F.2d at 614).
103. Id. at 196-97 (citing Atari, 672 F.2d at 615). "Scenes a faire" is "the sequence or
pattern of scenes or events which necessarily must follow from the handling of similar plot
situations." Copyright protection does not extend to such scenes. Miller Brewing Co. v. Car-
ling O'Keefe Breweries of Canada, Ltd., 452 F. Supp. 429, 439 (W.D.N.Y. 1978).
104. The description of the game was: "a maze chase game in which the player scores
points by guiding a central figure through various passageways of a maze and at the same time
avoiding collision with certain opponents or pursuit figures which move independently about
the maze. Under certain conditions, the central figure may temporarily become empowered to
chase and overtake the opponents, thereby scoring bonus points." Atari, 672 F.2d at 617. See
Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675 (1st Cir. 1967) (The court declined to
extend copyright protection to the rules of a promotional game because the rules could only be
expressed in a very limited number of ways. If the rules were copyrighted, the owner of the
copyright would also appropriate the substance of the game, preventing others from using the
idea.).
105. Atari, 672 F.2d at 617.
106. Id. at 618.
107. Id at 617-18.
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Similarly, Krofft involved the "non-real world" characters and lo-
cale which comprised the authors' expression." °8 Sid & Marty Krofft
alleged that the defendant, McDonalds, had infringed their copyright in
the H.R. Pufnstuf television series with its McDonaldland commercials.
The Ninth Circuit applied its own extrinsic/intrinsic test for substantial
similarity," °9 concluding that a jury could find McDonalds had copied
the expressive elements of the Pufnstuf show in their McDonaldland tele-
vision commercials." 0 The expressive elements were the "non-real
world" characters and locale which were solely the creation of the origi-
nal author. The court found that "complexity and artistry of the expres-
sion of an idea will separate it from even the most banal idea."'"
In comparing the commercials to the video games involved in Atari
and the television commercial in Krofft, the Blore court made a broad
leap in concluding that "the expressive aspects of the Blore commercials
extend[ed] to the individual artistic choices such as a particular montage
style, camera angle, framing, hairstyle, jewelry, decor, makeup and back-
ground."' 2 Although the disputed works in both Atari and Krofft were
audiovisual, they are easily distinguished from Blore. Unlike both Atari
and Krofft, Blore did not involve the expression of "non-real world"
characters and locale. The only character in the Blore commercials is
Deborah Shelton, who cannot be the subject of copyright protection." 
3
If the Blore court had applied the abstractions test used in Atari, it
could have accurately described Blore's commercials in fairly abstract
terms: a rapid edit style commercial, using closeups of a celebrity
spokesperson to tout a particular product. Therefore, under the abstrac-
tions test, the copying would have been only of idea and not expression.
The court, instead, applied the Ninth Circuit extrinsic/intrinsic test
formulated in Krofft. Admitting the difficulty in "[a]pplying the intrinsic
108. Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1167 n.9.
The "Living Island" locale of Pufnstuf and "McDonaldland" are both imaginary
worlds inhabited by anthromorphic plants and animals and other fanciful crea-
tures.... The characters are also similar. Both lands are governed by Mayors who
have disproportionately large round heads dominated by long wide mouths. They
are assisted by "Keystone cop" characters. Both lands feature strikingly similar
crazy scientists and a multi-armed evil creature. It seems clear that such similarities
go beyond merely that of the idea into the area of expression. The use of the basic
idea of the works does not inevitably result in such similarities.
IdL
109. Id. at 1165-67.
110. Id. at 1.169.
111. Id. at 1168.
112. Blore, 674 F. Supp. at 677.
113. Id. at 676 ("[c]opyright protection subsists.., in original works of authorship..
(quoting 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1982))).
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test to the nontextual elements of a thirty second television commer-
cial[ ],' 114 the Blore court relied heavily on the "total concept and feel"
of the commercials.115 Whether this concept stands alone or is part of
the intrinsic test is unclear. In either case, the "total concept and feel"
element is ambiguous. The court offers no definition of what constitutes
"total concept and feel." '116 Providing that this element is capable of def-
inition, concepts, like ideas, are not copyrightable.
1 17
In comparing these three cases involving audiovisual works, the
court should have reached the conclusion, under the abstractions test,
that the expression in the Blore commercials is indistinguishable from
the idea. Therefore, near identical copying of the commercials would be
required before infringement could be found,118 and the court should
have granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment. However,
by applying the Ninth Circuit test, the court avoids expert analysis and
dissection in the extrinsic test. Therefore, the court never looks at the
protectable expression of the works and is unable to grant the defendants'
motion for summary judgment. In addition, because of the brevity of the
television commercials, the court cannot apply the intrinsic portion of
the test. Instead, its decision is based on the nebulous "total concept and
feel" of the commercials.
B. Comparing Audiovisual Works to Photographs
The Blore court looked for additional support by comparing the case
to Kisch v. Ammirati & Puris, Inc.,19 which involved copyright protec-
114. Blore, 674 F. Supp. at 679.
115. Id. at 679-80.
116. Professor Nimmer wrote:
It has been said that where both the plaintiff's and defendant's works are intended
for children, "in addition to the essential sequence of events we might properly con-
sider the 'total concept and feel' of the works in question." This was intended as an
alternative, not an additional standard to be satisfied in finding substantial similarity
of expression. It should not be understood to mean that what would otherwise con-
stitute an actionable similarity is rendered defensible because of a different "concept
and feel."
3 M. NIMMER, supra note 68, § 13.03[A], at 13-30 to -31.
117. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988): "In no case does copyright protection for an original work
of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept,
principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or
embodied in such a work." Id.
118. Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1167. "When the idea and its expression are thus inseparable,
copying the expression will not be barred, since protecting the expression in such circum-
stances would confer a monopoly of the idea upon the copyright owner free of the conditions
and limitations imposed by the patent law." Id. at 1168 (quoting Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry
Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 742 (9th Cir. 1971)).
119. 657 F. Supp. 380 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
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tion for photographs. In Kisch, the plaintiff alleged that the defendants'
photograph, used in an advertisement for Rose's Lime Juice, infringed
the copyright in his photograph.
120
The differences between the two photographs included: the plain-
tiff's photograph was in black and white while defendants' was in color;
plaintiff's photograph was of an unidentified woman while defendants'
was of a musician, John Lurie; the woman in the plaintiff's photograph
was holding a concertina while John Lurie was holding a saxophone; and
a bottle of lime juice and a portion of a table appeared in only the defend-
ants' photograph.' 2 ' The similarities between the photographs were as
follows:
Most noticeably, the two photographs were taken in the same
small comer of the Village Vanguard nightclub. The same
striking mural appears as the background for each photograph.
Both John Lurie and the woman in the plaintiff's photograph
are seated and holding a musical instrument .... [T]he light-
ing, camera angle and camera position appear to be similar in
each photograph.' 22
The Kisch court denied the defendants' motion for summary judg-
ment. 123 The court held that "a rational trier of fact would be permitted
to find that the underlying tone or mood of defendants' photograph was
similar to the original conception expressed in plaintiff's work." '124 The
court arrived at this conclusion using the Second Circuit test.' 25 Under
the extrinsic test, similarities relating to the idea 126 included using the
same lighting, the same camera angle and position, the same nightclub
and background, and using a subject seated and holding an instrument.
The underlying tone or mood of defendants' photograph constituted the
"illicit" copying of expression under the intrinsic test. 127
The aspects the Blore court found to be expressive included "mon-
tage style, camera angle, framing, hairstyle, jewelry, decor, makeup and
120. Id. at 381.
121. Id. at 384.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Kisch, 657 F. Supp. at 384.
125. Id. at 382-83 (citing Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946)). For a descrip-
tion of the Second Circuit test see supra text accompanying note 81.
126. When the Second Circuit, in Arnstein, "refers to 'copying' which is not itself an in-
fringement, it must be suggesting copying merely of the work's idea, which is not protected by
the copyright. To constitute an infringement, the copying must reach the point of 'unlawful
appropriation,' or the copying of the protected expression itself." Sid & Marty Krofft Televi-
sion Prod. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1165 (9th Cir. 1977).
127. Kisch, 657 F. Supp. at 384.
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background." 128 These are the same elements which the Kisch court
found related merely to the idea of the photographs. Had the Blore court
used the Second Circuit test, as applied in Kisch, the result would be a
finding that these aspects were only ideas under the extrinsic portion of
the test.
Kisch is less helpful when applying the intrinsic portion of the test.
Noting the difficulty involved in the application of the ordinary observer
test, 29 the court simply decided that a rational trier of fact could find
that the underlying tone or mood of the works were similar.' 30 Blore
cited Kisch merely to support its reliance on the total concept and feel of
the commercials as the inevitable consequence of applying the intrinsic
test.
Arguably a "total concept and feel" or "underlying tone or mood"
test may be useful as applied to photographs. Since the subject of a pho-
tograph 131 and such devices as camera angle, camera position, lighting,
and background merely relate to the idea of the photograph and as such
are not protected by copyright, arguably the artists' expression lies in the
nebulous penumbra of "total concept and feel." However, this argument
suggests the importance of expert testimony and dissection in the extrin-
sic portion of the test so that the trier of fact does not become an art
critic. 13 2 The Blore court noted one very important reason for avoiding
comparisons between television commercials (audiovisual works) and
photographs. "The expressive aspects of audiovisual works, and of tele-
vision in particular, necessarily include both images and sounds since
without either there can be no communication and hence no
expression."133
128. Blore, 674 F. Supp. at 677.
129. Kisch, 657 F. Supp. at 383. "Comparison of two works involves a 'closer inspection,
more attentive to detail' than a mere 'generalized impression,' but 'still no more than could
reasonably be expected of a lay' or ordinary observer." Id. (quoting First American Artificial
Flowers, Inc. v. Joseph Markovits, Inc., 342 F. Supp. 178, 186 (S.D.N.Y. 1972)). "Trouble-
some, too, is the fact that the same general principles are applied in claims involving plays,
novels, sculpture, maps, directories of information, musical compositions, as well as artistic
paintings." Kisch, 657 F. Supp. at 383 (quoting Franklin Mint Corp. v. National Wildlife Art
Exchg., 575 F.2d 62, 65 (3d Cir. 1978)).
130. Kisch, 657 F. Supp. at 384.
131. As Justice Holmes stated in Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co.: "Others are free
to copy the original. They are not free to copy the copy." Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 249. This
concept supports the idea that Kisch was incorrectly decided.
132. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
133. Blore, 674 F. Supp. at 677 (emphasis added).
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C. Comparing Audiovisual Works with Motion Pictures
Motion pictures constitute a subcategory within the category of au-
diovisual works under the statute. 34 The Blore court cited Time Inc. v.
Bernard Geis Associates 135 to support its proposition that elements of cre-
ativity include such choices as the kind of camera, film, lens, the area
covered, the timing and the filming location.
136
Geis was a copyright infringement action where the defendants al-
legedly copied the expressive elements of several frames 137 of the plain-
tiff's home movie of the John F. Kennedy assassination. 138  The
defendants had drawn sketches from frames of the movie for his book,
"Six Seconds in Dallas," a study of the Kennedy assassination.' 39  The
defendants contended that the movie lacked sufficient originality for
copyright protection, because the subject of the movie was a news event,
and news events may not be copyrighted."4 The Geis court found that
the plaintiff's work contained many elements of creativity, making it suf-
ficiently original for copyright protection.' 4 ' However, the court granted
summary judgment for the defendants based on their claim of "fair
use."'
14 2
134. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(6) (1982). The problem in comparing a television commercial with
a motion picture is that the brevity of the television commercial (approximately thirty seconds)
substantially precludes the development of specific plots or characters. Miller Brewing Co. v.
Carling O'Keefe Breweries of Canada, Ltd., 452 F. Supp. 429, 441 (W.D.N.Y. 1978). Thus,
the ordinary reasonable person standard for finding substantial similarity of expression may be
unfair because the television commercial audience is somewhat less discriminating than the
motion picture audience. "Television commercials as the United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit noted with respect to video games, 'unlike an artist's painting or even other
audiovisual works, appeal to an audience that is fairly undiscriminating insofar as their con-
cern about more subtle differences in artistic expression.' " Blore, 674 F. Supp. at 680 (citing
Atari, Inc. v. North American Philips Consumer Elec. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 619 (7th Cir.
1982)).
135. 293 F. Supp. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
136. Blore, 674 F. Supp. at 677.
137. "Frame" refers to each separate photograph in a series. "A motion picture consists of
a series of photographs showing the objects in a scene in successive positions slightly changed."
Geis, 293 F. Supp. at 132.
138. Id. at 138-39.
139. Id. at 131.
140. Id. at 143.
141. Id.
142. Geis, 293 F. Supp. at 146. The concept of fair use applied in Geis was derived from
H.R. 2512, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. § 107 (1967), a bill for the general revision of the copyright
laws.
Limitations on exclusive rights: Fair Use
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, the fair use of a copyrighted
work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other
means specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism, comment, news re-
porting, teaching, scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright. In
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Because the allegedly infringing works were the artist's sketches of
specific frames of the plaintiff's film, the Geis court treated the case
under the pictorial, graphic and sculptural works category of the stat-
ute. 143 The court stated that the author's artistic choices constituted suf-
ficient originality to entitle the work to copyright protection. The court
did not, however, decide whether they could sufficiently separate these
artistic choices from the ideas to reach the issue of unlawful appropria-
tion. In addition, the Geis case is factually inapposite to Blore because it
involved a news event and accordingly, turned on the issue of fair use.
Citing Geis for support, the Blore court avoided the difficult issue of sepa-
rating idea from expression.
D. Miller Gets Canned
Duling and 20/20 relied on Miller Brewing Co. v. Carling O'Keefe
Breweries of Canada, Ltd.," ' to support their position. Miller was a
copyright infringement action between the producers of television beer
commercials.145 The four Miller commercials are set in a tavern and use
famous personalities to promote Miller's "LITE" beer. Each ends with a
closeup of the bottle, can, and frosty mug trio. 146 Carling, the defendant,
determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use, the
factors to be considered shall include:
(1) the purpose and character of the use;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copy-
righted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copy-
righted work.
17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982).
143. Geis 293 F. Supp. at 143. For a discussion of the problems involved in comparing an
audiovisual work with a pictorial work, see supra text accompanying note 132.
144. 452 F. Supp. 429 (W.D.N.Y. 1978).
145. Id. at 434. The plaintiff's (Miller) commercials were primarily shown in the United
States and Alberta, Canada. The defendant's (Carling) commercials were shown primarily in
Canada, but commercials were also run in Buffalo, New York, because such transmissions
were received by television viewers in Ontario either directly or through cable television sys-
tems and because of cost efficiency (such stations reach a larger audience than Canadian
stations).
146. Id. at 435. In the "Mackey-Snell" commercial, two men are arm wrestling while
Mackey addresses the camera and informs the audience that LITE is less filling and tastes
great. Both men then recite in unison that "in fact after I teach this guy a lesson, I'm going to
have another bottle." The camera immediately focuses on a closeup of the familiar trio of
bottle, can and foamy-headed glass of beer, a groan is heard at the end of the arm wrestling
duel, and the announcer's voice reads the words emblazoned across the screen: "LITE beer
from Miller. Everything you always wanted in a beer. (Pause) And less."
In the "Rudolph-Heinsohn" commercial, after Heinsohn notes his frequent basketball
game disagreements with Rudolph, he acknowledges that they finally agree on something:
LITE beer from Miller. They quickly digress into an argument over LITE's attributes (less
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produced three television commercials to promote their "HIGHLITE"
beer. The Carling commercials did not employ famous personalities;
however, Carling filmed them in a tavern and used the same concluding
format of bottle, can, and frosty mug.'47
Carling alleged that the idea of the Miller commercials was to use
famous personalities in rather absurd situations-arguing and reciting
verse about light beer-and that the expression of the commercials "are
the actual words used by the characters and the characters themselves
(famous athletes)."' 48 The court agreed, finding that Carling had only
copied the ideas or themes of the Miller commercials and not the protect-
able expression. 49
The Blore case is factually similar to Miller. The subjects in both
cases were commercials. The advertising was done in the same medium
(television), making the two "audiovisual" cases more comparable. 50
The commercials compared in Blore and those compared in Miller in-
volved different text while employing the same format."'5 Additionally,
the defendants in both cases alleged that the expression of the commer-
cials was indistinguishable from their ideas and thus could not be the
filling or tastes great). The same concluding format is utilized with the announcer's voice
heard as the camera focuses on the trio of bottle, can and frosty beer glass.
In the third commercial, football player, Deacon Jones, strolls menacingly through a bar
as the crowd parts in his path. He then poetically relates LITE's beneficial characteristics
ending with a threat to break a nose if no one believes him. The commercial ends with the
familiar concluding format.
The last commercial employs the Van Arsdale twins to recite the commercial's message in
unison. A disagreement arises over the tastes great, less filling attributes, resulting in utter
confusion between them as to each's identity. Again, the audience sees the same concluding
format.
147. Id. at 436. The first commercial shows two unidentified arm wrestlers. One tells the
other that HIGHLITE is brewed like a regular beer. The other responds that HIGHLITE
tastes less filling. The statements are repeated and in the interim, the camera focuses on two
bottles of HIGHLITE as a third man sits down between the arm wrestlers. He points out that
they both drink HIGHLITE because it tastes great and has fewer than seventy calories per
bottle. The arm wrestlers agree momentarily, but lapse into an argument over who will buy
the next round of beer. A closeup follows, showing a HIGHLITE bottle next to a full glass of
beer, and the announcer exclaims that HIGHLITE is "a new lite beer for all kinds of reasons."
In Carling's "delivery man" commercial, a gregarious fellow joins his friends at a table in
a tavern and recites a poem revealing the attributes of HIGHLITE. This brings forth a roar
from the crowd. The familiar closing follows. In the "McCluskey brothers" commercial, the
three brothers stand arm in arm while each relates a message of why he drinks HIGHLITE.
Jim then lifts the other two brothers off the ground by the back of their shirts and the same
ending follows.
148. Id. at 440.
149. Miller, 452 F. Supp. at 440.
150. See supra text accompanying note 133.
151. Blore, 674 F. Supp. at 675; Miller, 452 F. Supp. at 437-38 (all of the commercials
involved had similar ending formats using closeups of bottles, cans and frosty glasses).
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subject of copyright protection. 52
The court in Blore rejected the Miller case as only tangentially re-
lated to the suit between Blore and 20/20.153 The court described the
copyright issue in Miller as centered on the literary, rather than the au-
diovisual, aspects of the commercials.I54 The Miller court stated that
"[t]he use of arm wrestling in Miller's Mackey-Snell commercial does not
express the theme that LITE is less filing and still tastes great. It is
merely used as a vehicle for placing characters in context."' 55 In finding
the ideas or themes of the commercials indistinguishable from their ex-
pression, the Miller court used the scenes a faire test, which is often used
in analyzing literary works.
However, courts apply the "scenes a faire" test to determine
whether an author's expression can be separated from his ideas. The test
is not used solely to analyze literary works. In fact, the Atari court, an-
other case the Blore court cited for support, used both scenes a faire and
the abstractions test in its attempt to separate idea from expression.'
56
Additionally, the court ignored certain nonliterary aspects, such as using
the common ending format of the Miller and Carling commercials and
the closeups of the bottle, can, and frosty glass trio. Thus, the Blore
court erred by failing to place more weight on the Miller case.
VII. CONCLUSION
Advertising is undoubtedly a proper subject for copyright protec-
tion. However, copyright does not protect against the borrowing of ab-
stract ideas contained in copyrighted works. The author's protection is
limited to his individual "expression" of abstract ideas.
While theoretically sound, the principle of separating ideas from
their expression is problematic. Several tests have been formulated, re-
formulated, misinterpreted, and misapplied in the attempt to draw this
line.
The Ninth Circuit test formulated in Krofft is particularly problem-
atic. Courts' failure to recognize the importance of allowing expert testi-
mony and dissection in separating ideas from expression creates
confusion. The confusion is particularly evident in C. Blore & D. Rich-
man, Inc. v. 20/20 Advertising. The Blore court failed to separate ideas
152. Blore, 674 F. Supp. at 676; Miller, 452 F. Supp. at 440.
153. Blore, 674 F. Supp. at 678.
154. Id.
155. Miller, 452 F. Supp. at 440 (emphasis added).
156. Atari, Inc. v. North American Philips Consumer Elec. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 615 (7th
Cir. 1982). See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
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from expression before applying the ordinary observer test. This failure
contributed to the court's inability to recognize that the expression in the
Blore commercials was indistinguishable from the ideas and, therefore,
not protected by copyright. Ultimately, the Blore court relied on the am-
biguous "total concept and feel" of the commercials to deny the defend-
ants' motion for summary judgment.
This case is a perfect illustration of Professor Nimmer's criticism of
the Ninth Circuit test as formulated in Krofft. By not allowing expert
testimony and dissection in the extrinsic portion of the test to distill the
author's expression from the unprotected ideas, the court is unnecessarily
restrained from ruling for the defendants in advance of trial. Nimmer's
criticism stems from the belief that Krofft misinterprets the Second Cir-
cuit test, developed in Arnstein, as not requiring any separation of idea
and expression in the extrinsic test.'57 Although Krofft stated that the
Ninth Circuit's articulation of the rule is not dependent on its reading of
Arnstein, "in the interest of justice and of avoiding nuisance litigation, it
is to be hoped that future decisions will view the scope of the extrinsic
test as that suggested by Arnstein rather than that adopted in Krofft. " 1
58
Karen L. Poston
157. 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 68, § 13.03[E], at 13-59 to -60.
158. Id. § 13.03[E], at 13-60.
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